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We build a simple model in which corporate governance may allow for institutions act-
ing as commitment devices (e.g., the introduction of independent and minority members
in the board). The model predicts that the incentive to adopt an institution — letting
the general interest of shareholders prevail over private beneﬁts of control by dominant
shareholders — is decreasing in ownership concentration and increasing in free cash ﬂow.
We take the predictions of our theoretical model to the data, by providing empirical
evidence on the board structure of Italian listed companies over the period 2004-2007.
We ﬁnd that board composition favors independent members in ﬁrms where the free
cash ﬂow is large, and executive members in ﬁrms with high ownership concentration
a n di nf a m i l yﬁrms, supporting the view of corporate governance as a mechanism to
control agency costs. More ambiguous conclusions are reached as for the link between
governance and ﬁrm value, as the presence of minority lists in the board appears to
improve value while that of independent members reduces performance.
Keywords: corporate boards, agency problems, private beneﬁts, ﬁrms’ performance.
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11 Introduction
A growing literature conveys the basic message that corporate boards should be
designed to eﬃciently cope with the separation between ownership and control.
In practice, the nature of the agency problems, as well as the institutional so-
lutions to them, diﬀer across several dimensions. While in the U.S.A. the main
issue is managers’ opportunistic behavior, in continental Europe — where ﬁrms
exhibit a high level of ownership concentration — the focus is on the divergence
of interests between large and small shareholders. In this respect, independent
directors are included in the board with the task of protecting the interests of
small shareholders, limiting the extraction of private beneﬁts by the controlling
party.
In this paper, we build a simple theoretical model, where a dominant owner —
able to extract private beneﬁts of control — may decide to introduce a governance
institution in order to avoid the agency costs due to the incentive distortion
associated to rent extraction. Such a governance institution (e.g., the independent
directors and the representatives of small shareholders in the board) works as a
commitment device. By adopting it, the dominant owner implicitly commits to
let the general interest of all shareholders prevail over her own private beneﬁts1.
However, the adoption of the institution determines the emergence of interference
and coordination costs.
Absent such an institution, the equilibrium level of private beneﬁts is nega-
tively related with the degree of ownership concentration, since the incentives of
t h ed o m i n a n to w n e ra r em o r ea l i g n e dw i t ht h o s eo ft h eo t h e rs h a r e h o l d e r sw h e n
she retains a large stake in the ﬁrm. The extraction of private beneﬁts is instead
increasing in the level of free cash ﬂow, since the latter can be considered as a
proxy for the funds available for discretionary use. Hence, the incentive to adopt
a governance institution as a monitor for agency costs is decreasing in ownership
concentration and increasing in the ﬁrm free cash ﬂow. Obviously, the governance
1Our model focuses on the moral hazard created by the possible extraction of private beneﬁts
of control. In an adverse selection framework, where entrepreneurs diﬀer in their abilities to
extract private beneﬁts, governance institutions could also play an important signalling role
(see Baglioni, 2010a).
2institution should be adopted only whenever its beneﬁts exceeds its costs.
Although theoretically convincing, it can not be taken for granted that the
idea of boards being designed in order to mitigate agency problems holds true in
practice, especially for economies where the ownership of corporations is concen-
trated. It is often heard in the policy debate that when ﬁrms are closely held,
majority shareholders may be tempted to implement corporate governance struc-
tures allowing them to eﬀectively direct ﬁrms’ actions, without exerting too much
eﬀorts to properly account for the concerns of other stakeholders (such as minor-
ity shareholders). This may occur even when it is doubtful that their decisions
are consistent with the objective of maximizing ﬁrm’s value. Should this happen,
it would obviously be in contrast with the message conveyed by our theoretical
model.
The two contrasting views outlined above on the design of corporate gover-
nance lead to testable implications that can be taken to the data. Our theoretical
model predicts that the degree of board independence is decreasing in ownership
concentration and increasing in the level of free cash ﬂow. Although the expected
relationship between board independence and ownership concentration would be
the same also under the alternative view of governance as a ‘facilitator’ of rent
extraction by dominant owners, the predicted eﬀect of free cash ﬂow on gover-
nance is the opposite. In fact, an owner aiming at maximizing rent extraction
would limit board independence the larger is the scope for private beneﬁts, i.e.
t h ef r e ec a s hﬂow.
In order to confront these contrasting views, we empirically investigate the
governance of a large sample of listed ﬁrms in the Italian stock exchange, over
the time interval 2004-2007. The Italian case is ideal to study the determinants
of corporate boards organization. Italian ﬁrms are indeed very closely held: on
average about 57% of the ownership of all listed ﬁrms (the same percentage for
those included in our sample) is accounted by the top three shareholders. Fur-
thermore, about 33% of listed ﬁrms (36% in our sample) are controlled by a
single family, and anecdotal evidence maintains that family ﬁrms are character-
ized by a very tight control by their owners, which may sometimes result in a
weak representation of the remaining stakeholders.
3Our econometric exercises show that board composition favors independent
members in ﬁrms where the free cash ﬂow is large. This ﬁnding supports the
view of corporate governance as a tool to control agency costs, rather than as
a way to maximize rent extraction. Consistently with our theoretical model, we
also ﬁnd that executive members are the majority in the boards of ﬁrms with
high ownership concentration and of family ﬁrms, where small shareholders are
more protected by an ‘incentive alignment eﬀect’.
T h ei m p a c to fg o v e r n a n c eo nﬁrm performance and value is much less clear-
cut. In fact, on the one hand, performance appears being negatively correlated to
the share of independent members in the board and positively correlated with that
of executive members. This suggests that the adoption of governance institutions
to control agency issues occurs even when the costs of doing so exceeds its beneﬁts.
A result that is somewhat puzzling, since one would expect that a governance
institution is adopted only when improving ﬁrm performance and value. On the
other hand, the presence of minority lists in the board has a positive impact on
ﬁrm market value, which suggests that the market appreciates the introduction
of an institution aimed at protecting the interests of small shareholders.
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 brieﬂy reviews the corporate
ﬁnance literature related to our argument. Section 3 develops a simple theoret-
ical model dealing with the design of corporate governance institutions under
moral hazard. Section 4 describes our data set and methodology, and presents
an empirical analysis of governance institutions for Italian listed ﬁrms. Section 5
concludes.
2 Related literature
A number of recent empirical studies support the view that ﬁrms design their
governance institutions in a way that allows them to minimize the agency costs
arising from the separation between ownership and control. Cross-sectional ev-
idence shows that the structure of boards depends on ﬁrms’ features aﬀecting
their speciﬁc contracting environment, such as their size, ownership concentra-
tion, sector of activity.
4Linck, Netter and Yang (2007) ﬁnd — among others — that board indepen-
dence is increasing in the availability of managerial private beneﬁts, measured
by free cash ﬂow, and board independence is decreasing in insiders’ incentives
alignment, proxied by the CEO ownership stake in the ﬁrm. Similarly, Lehn,
Patro and Zaho (2009) show the existence of a direct relation between board in-
dependence and ﬁrm size, where the latter is interpreted as a proxy for the extent
of agency conﬂicts between managers and owners. Also Boone, Field, Karpoﬀ
and Raheja (2007) ﬁnd that several measures of ﬁrm size and complexity are
positively related to board size and independence, pointing to the need of mon-
itoring and advising by specialized directors. Coles, Naveen and Naveen (2008)
show that insider representation in the board is increasing in the relevance of
ﬁrm-speciﬁc knowledge, proxied by R&D intensity. Finally, Gillan, Hartzell and
Starks (2006) focus on the interplay between the internal mechanisms for con-
trolling agency problems (like board structure and charter provisions) and the
external ones (like the market for corporate control and the legal environment),
ﬁnding that they act as substitutes in the design of corporate governance.
The advisory and monitoring roles of directors are highlighted by the most
recent contributions to the theory of corporate boards, claiming that the optimal
structure of the board emerges by balancing the costs and beneﬁts of these two
tasks. For instance, Adams and Ferreira (2007) stress that, on the one hand,
a more independent board monitors more intensively managers’ decisions but,
on the other hand, managers are reluctant to reveal ﬁrm-speciﬁci n f o r m a t i o nt o
an independent board, as this information may be used both for advising and
for interfering. For this reason, since the communication between managers and
board is valuable, shareholders might prefer to appoint less independent directors
(a ‘friendly board’).
Similar results are reached by Harris and Raviv (2008). In their model, an
inside (executive) director is better informed than an outside (independent) direc-
tor; but the former’s objective function is distorted by private beneﬁts, contrary
to the latter. When the information available to insiders is critical, shareholders
prefer a board dominated by them, as their advisory role is essential. To the
contrary, when the agency costs — generated by the possibility to extract private
5beneﬁts — are more relevant, a board dominated by outsiders is preferred, since
their monitoring role becomes crucial.
3 Governance institutions as a commitment de-
vice: a simple model
We consider a common knowledge setup in which a representative entrepreneur,
denoted by E, owns an entirely equity ﬁnanced ﬁrm of value V = Vmax − C (B),
where Vmax indicates the value of the ﬁrm in the absence of private beneﬁts
extraction, B denotes E’s private beneﬁts of control and C (B) —w i t hC0 (B) > 0
and C00 (B) > 0 — is the cost of private beneﬁts extraction. Furthermore, we
assume that 0 ≤ B ≤ ¯ B,w h e r e ¯ B ≡ γF with 0 <γ≤ 1,a n dF denotes the
ﬁrm’s free cash ﬂow.
We consider a situation in which E sells an (exogenous) equity stake (1 − α)
to external dispersed investors (small shareholders), receiving a revenue denoted
by R. She however retains control over the ﬁrm for any relevant values of her
stake α. The utility function of the entrepreneur is given by
U(B)+αV + R,( 1 )
where U(B) is assumed to be strictly concave, and U(0) = 0. Note that the
value of B is established after issuing equity, as we assume that it can not be
contracted ex ante due to the incompleteness of contracts.
The assumption that the entrepreneur raises external funds in the form of
equity enables us to focus directly on the conﬂict of interest between controlling
and minority shareholders. The entrepreneur is interested in maximizing the
value of the ﬁrm; but at the same time she is interested in maximizing her own
private beneﬁts of control, such as perks, empire building, deals with related
parties, and diversion of funds. The extraction of private beneﬁts comes at a
cost, which induces a reduction of the ﬁrm value. The scope for the extraction of
private beneﬁts is larger the higher is the ﬁrm free cash ﬂow, which is a measure
of the funds available for discretionary use not being committed to any speciﬁc
purpose (see Jensen, 1986). To capture this eﬀect in the simplest possible way,
6we assume that there is an upper bound to the possibility of extracting private
beneﬁts, modeled as a fraction of the ﬁrm’s free cash ﬂo w . N o t ea l s ot h a tt h e
information regarding private beneﬁts is typically not veriﬁable or too complex
to be described in details, so that ﬁnancial contracts cannot prescribe a speciﬁc
level of B, which creates a moral hazard issue.
As for external investors, we assume that they are risk neutral and, due to
competition among them, they demand an expected return equal to the riskless
rate of interest, which we normalize to zero.
After having issued equity, the entrepreneur takes R as given and solves
max
0≤B≤ ¯ B
U(B)+α[Vmax − C (B)],( 2 )
which is a concave problem. Therefore, the unique interior solution of the problem










B∗ if B∗ < ¯ B
¯ B otherwise.
(4)
By applying the implicit function theorem, it is immediate to see that (3)
implicitly deﬁnes B∗ as a decreasing function of α,s ot h a tBE is decreasing in α
in the interior solution case, and unaﬀected by α in the corner solution case. To
the contrary, given that ¯ B is increasing in F by deﬁnition, BE is increasing in F
in the corner solution case and unaﬀected by F in the interior solution case. We
can summarize the above discussion by stating the following
Proposition 1 The equilibrium level of private beneﬁts BE is a non-increasing
function of α and a non-decreasing function of F.
According to Proposition 1, the separation between ownership (partly trans-
ferred to small outside shareholders) and control (fully retained by the entrepre-
neur) leads to an excessive level of private beneﬁts. The entrepreneur is induced
to increase her own private beneﬁts, as she is able to shift part of their marginal
7cost to small shareholders, while retaining the full marginal utility — which is
the well known result of Jensen and Meckling (1976). Furthermore, the incentive
distortion is stronger the higher the values of the free cash ﬂow, as a larger F
makes it easier for E to extract private beneﬁts.
To evaluate the agency costs induced by the presence of moral hazard, it is
useful to compute the utility level achieved by E in the benchmark case of com-
plete contracts and then compare it with that under contractual incompleteness.
If contracts were complete, E w o u l db ea b l et oc o m m i tt oas p e c i ﬁc level of B
before issuing equity, and she could take into account that such a level aﬀects the




U(B)+α[Vmax − C (B)] + R = U(B)+Vmax − C (B).( 5 )
It is immediate to see that E would set the level of B as if she retained the whole
equity of the ﬁrm. The interior solution of Problem (5) is obviously given by
U
0( ˆ B)=C
0( ˆ B),( 6 )
and E’s utility level would be
U( ˆ B)+Vmax − C( ˆ B).( 7 )
Note that we focus on the interior solution case only, as it is natural to assume
that ˆ B<¯ B. Otherwise, the agency problem does not emerge since the ﬁrst best
solution for B coincides with the equilibrium one ¯ B,s i n c eB∗ > ˆ B.
However, the ﬁrst best solution is precluded by the incompleteness of con-
tracts. Since she can not commit ex ante, E sets the level of B after selling
equity, hence taking the price as given. Investors anticipate the equilibrium
level of private beneﬁts BE, which is incorporated into the selling price of equity
R∗ =( 1− α){Vmax − C(BE)}. Therefore, the equilibrium level of E’s utility is
given by
U(BE)+α{Vmax − C(BE)} + R
∗ = U(BE)+Vmax − C(BE).( 8 )
8By taking the diﬀerence between the optimal level of utility (Equation 7))
and the equilibrium one (Equation (8)), we can write the agency cost as
AC = C(BE) − C( ˆ B) −
n
U(BE) − U( ˆ B)
o
> 0 (9)
that is positive by deﬁnition, since ˆ B is the argmax of the objective function (5).
It is therefore apparent that the entrepreneur bears the full cost of the incentive
distortion created by the ability to extract private beneﬁts.
The following proposition studies the relationship between the agency cost
and the share of equity retained by the entrepreneur, as well as the ﬁrm’s free
cash ﬂow.
Proposition 2 T h ea g e n c yc o s tAC,d e ﬁned in Equation (9), is non-increasing
in α and non-decreasing in F.
Proof. Focus on the interior solution case in which BE = B∗.B yd i ﬀerenti-
ating AC with respect to α,w eg e t
dAC
dα

























as (1 − α)
dC(B∗)
dB∗ > 0 by assumption and dB∗
dα < 0,a ss h o w na b o v e . A sf o rt h e
corner solution, in which BE = ¯ B, it is immediate to see that the agency cost is
not aﬀected by α.T h i sp r o v e st h eﬁrst part of the proposition.
To show that AC is non-decreasing in F, ﬁrst observe that B∗ does not depend
on F. Turning to the corner solution BE = ¯ B, one has
dAC
dF































dB2 < 0 and
d2C(B)
dB2 > 0.H e n c e ,o n eh a sdAC
dF > 0, which completes the proof of the proposition.
9Proposition 2 shows that the agency cost (weakly) increases in the share
(1 − α) of equity sold to dispersed shareholders and in the level of the free cash
ﬂow. As expected, the agency cost — due to an excessive extraction of private
beneﬁts — is increasing in the equilibrium level of private beneﬁts. The latter
in turn increases with (1 − α) and F (as it has been shown in Proposition 1).
It follows that, in equilibrium, the cost of the incentive distortion is higher the
lower is the fraction of equity retained by the entrepreneur, and the larger is the
scope for the extraction of private beneﬁts as measured by the free cash ﬂow.
In recent years, an increasing role has been assigned to ‘independent’ direc-
tors, who are supposed to act in the interest of all shareholders by reducing the
possibility that the private beneﬁts of large shareholders prevail over the maxi-
mization of the ﬁrm value. Independent directors also play a crucial role in (audit,
compensation, nomination) committees within the board. In general, the legal
system provides a framework within which corporations are free to self-regulate,
through charter provisions and other internal rules. For example, in most coun-
tries there is only a requirement of a minimum number of independent directors,
leaving shareholders free to appoint a larger number of them. By allowing for the
presence of a large share of independent directors in the board, an entrepreneur
can commit to let the general interest of shareholders — namely the maximization
of the ﬁrm value — prevail over her own private beneﬁts.
We introduce this issue into the model by assuming that E can adopt a gov-
ernance institution I such that the decision over B is delegated to a third party
who maximizes U (B)+V . By adopting the governance institution — e.g., by
allowing for a strong independent component within the board — the entrepre-
neur implicitly commits to leave the decision over the level of private beneﬁts to
someone who acts as if he were the full owner of the ﬁrm. This is equivalent to
a commitment for setting B = ˆ B. Note that it seems natural to assume that E
has to decide whether to adopt the institution before issuing equity, reﬂecting the
fact that the design of the governance rules is a long run decision, which cannot
easily be modiﬁed afterwards.
The cost of this commitment is that the third party, entitled to decide over
B, can also interfere with the management of the ﬁrm and impose constraints
10on investment decisions. As a consequence the governance institution may be
responsible for causing ineﬃciencies in the decision making of the board (e.g.
by possibly turning down some good investment opportunities). To model this
circumstance, we assume that the adoption of the governance institution entails
an interference cost K,w i t hK strictly larger than zero. Thus, a governance
institution is adopted if and only if
AC > K.( 1 0 )
On the one hand, by adopting the institution the entrepreneur avoids the agency
cost, due to her ability to extract private beneﬁts of control. On the other hand,
she incurs in the interference cost K. Therefore, we can state the following propo-
sition, the proof of which follows immediately from Proposition 2 and Condition
(10).
Proposition 3 The incentive for the entrepreneur to adopt the governance in-
stitution I is non-increasing in α and non-decreasing in F.
The higher is the equity share retained by the entrepreneur, the lower is the
agency cost of private beneﬁts, since her own incentives are more aligned with
those of the other shareholders; hence the gain from adopting the governance
institution is lower as well. To the contrary, a larger scope for private beneﬁt
extraction, as measured by F, makes the agency problem more severe, which
increases the incentives to adopt a governance institution avoiding it.
4 Empirical analysis
We can identify the governance institution limiting the extraction of private ben-
eﬁts with the presence of independent members and of minority representatives
in the board. Thus, the theoretical model of the previous section leads to clear
testable propositions about the corporate governance of listed ﬁrms. In partic-
ular, based on Proposition 3, we expect that the degree of board independence
is (1) decreasing in ownership concentration, and (2) increasing in the free cash
ﬂow.
11A third implication of our theoretical model concerns the eﬀect of adopting
a governance institution on ﬁrms’ performance and value. Our model predicts
that a governance institution is adopted whenever the agency cost that such an
institution would allow to avoid exceeds the interference and coordination costs
associated with setting-up the institution. As a consequence, its adoption should
improve performance and increase the value of the ﬁrm.
The empirical analysis of this section is primarily aimed at testing these state-
ments. In doing so, however, we are able to derive additional evidence on the
corporate governance of Italian listed ﬁrms and on its links with ﬁrms’ perfor-
mance, going beyond the direct implications of the theoretical model.
4.1 Dataset and methodology
We have constructed a comprehensive dataset of all ﬁrms listed in the Italian
stock exchange over the period 2004-2007, collecting information on board and
ownership structure, as well as on ﬁrms’ characteristics and performance. A
list of the variables included in the dataset and used in the paper, with the
corresponding data sources and descriptive statistics, is given in the Appendix
Table.
In the econometric analysis below, we focus on a balanced panel of 157 ﬁrms
for which all needed data are available for all the years in the time interval we
consider. Although not reported in the paper, the results of the analysis for the
unbalanced panel of all listed ﬁrms are in line with those obtained here.2
It is important to note that our panel entails very little time-series (i.e. within-
subject) information, as there is an extremely limited variability over time among
all the board and ownership structure data included in our sample. Therefore, our
econometric exercises essentially exploit only the cross-sectional dimension of the
panel. For this reason, we resort to pooled cross-section regressions running time
ﬁxed eﬀects by means of a set of time dummy variables. We also check for the
presence of cluster eﬀects. The resulting cluster-robust standard errors provide
essentially the same information on the statistical signiﬁcance of the estimated
2Estimates are available from the authors upon request.
12coeﬃcients as those reported in the tables.
4.2 Ownership concentration and board composition
The ﬁrst testable implication of our theoretical model concerns the negative ex-
pected relationship between board independence and ownership concentration.
Tables 1 and 2 provide strong evidence in this direction.
[INSERT TABLES 1 AND 2 ABOUT HERE]
In particular, the ﬁr s tr o wi nT a b l e1s h o w st h a tt h es h a r eo fe x e c u t i v em e m -
bers in a board increases with ownership concentration consistently with the
theoretical model. Table 2 (ﬁrst row) shows that the likelihood of observing the
presence of a minority list in the election of the board (giving minority sharehold-
ers the opportunity of appointing at least one director) is decreasing in ownership
concentration3.
A variable playing a role that is similar to that of ownership concentration
is family ownership: the control over a ‘family ﬁrm’ is typically shared among
a few individuals belonging to the same family. For a given level of ownership
concentration, this enhances the concentration of power in the hands of a few
large shareholders pursuing the same interest. Therefore, we may expect that
the dummy on family ownership aﬀects the dependent variables in quite the same
way, and for the same reasons, as the ownership concentration variable. Indeed,
family ownership leads to boards with a larger share of executive members and
less independent members and minority representatives (see Table 1), as well as
to a smaller probability of observing executive and compensation committees (see
Table 2).
Although not directly related to the theoretical model of the previous section,
the control variables included in our empirical analysis provide additional ﬁnd-
ings on the corporate governance of Italian ﬁrms that are worth mentioning. In
3Year dummies show that the likelihood of minority lists increases through time: this is
to be attributed to the eﬀect of regulations implemented in recent years that strengthen the
extent of minority representation (see the Consolidated Law on Financial Intermediation).
13particular, ﬁrms having concentrated ownership and family ﬁrms appear having
smaller boards, with fewer independent members and minority representatives
included in the board. We may interpret this as evidence that controlling own-
ers prefer smaller boards where executives play a key role, in order to improve
eﬃciency and to avoid the coordination problems aﬀecting large boards. Simi-
lar considerations apply to committees, which are less likely to be present when
ownership concentration is higher: presumably the need to structure the board
in committees, where speciﬁc tasks are delegated to a subset of directors, is lower
in smaller boards that are less subject to coordination problems.
Our evidence also shows that the widely used shareholders’ agreements play
as i g n i ﬁcant role in shaping the boards of Italian listed ﬁrms. Through a share-
holders’ agreement, a small number of large shareholders formally commit to
coordinate their votes in general shareholders’ meetings, in order to exert a joint
control over the ﬁrm at the expense of other shareholders (exploiting a ‘leverage
eﬀect’)4. These agreements have often also the purpose of reaching a speciﬁc
composition of the board of directors, where each participant is entitled to ap-
point a given number of directors. Table 1 (third row) shows that boards include
a larger fraction of non-executive non-independent members in ﬁrms where an
agreement is present than in other ﬁrms. Indeed, these directors presumably rep-
resent the large shareholders participating in the agreement. Furthermore, Table
2 (third row) shows that the existence of a shareholders’ agreement increases
the probability that an executive committee is present, pointing to the possibil-
ity that executive committees act as bodies where the coordination among the
participants in the agreement takes place.
It is also interesting to note that in family ﬁrms the percentage of female
members over total directors is on average about 4% higher than in other ﬁrms.
This result may be interpreted as an indirect evidence of the diﬃculties that
women ﬁnd in reaching key positions in Italian corporations. These diﬃculties
appear to be lower in family ﬁrms, where family members are more likely to be
4Agreements of this type are diﬀused also in other European countries as a mean to deviate
from the one-share-one-vote principle; see EU (2007). For analyses of the eﬀects of sharehold-
ers’agreements on the governance of Italian ﬁrms, see Gianfrate (2007) and Baglioni (2010b).
14appointed as directors regardless of their gender, thus increasing the probability
that a woman is included in the board.
Finally, all regressions in Tables 1 and 2 have been run by adding controls
for speciﬁc sectors — namely high tech industries, ﬁnancial intermediaries, and
utilities. The evidence we obtain shows that the sector of activity plays a signif-
icant role in shaping the characteristics of the board5. Three observations are of
particular interest here. First, the boards of high tech ﬁrms appear to be smaller
and with a larger share of executive members. This result is most likely related
to the strategic advising role of directors: in high tech ﬁrms the need of speciﬁc
knowledge, embodied in executives, is presumably larger than in other sectors.
Second, ﬁnancial ﬁrms appear to have large boards with a signiﬁcant fraction of
independent members, which reduces the weight of executive members. This is
probably due to the fact that most large Italian banks and insurance companies
are at the core of a wide network of cross-ownerships and cross-directorships, in-
volving also non-ﬁnancial ﬁrms6. This feature of Italian ﬁnancial intermediaries
may suggest that the presence of a large number of independent members in the
board is explained by the need to adequately represent the interests of several
relevant shareholders. The large size of the board may be, in turn, at the ori-
gin of the widespread use of executive committees in ﬁnancial ﬁrms, as a way
to improve the eﬃciency of the decision process, and to preserve the role of top
managers within the board. It is worth noting that the likelihood of observing a
compensation committee is smaller for ﬁnancial ﬁrms than for other ﬁrms, point-
ing to a possible lack of transparency in the managerial compensation policy in
this sector. Third, the composition of the boards of utilities seems to reﬂect the
prominent role of public ownership in this industry: more than half of the utilities
included in our sample have in fact the public sector (either the central govern-
ment, or municipalities) as their main stockholder. The public nature of utilities
may help explaining the inclusion of many independent and minority members
in the board (at the expenses of executives), as representatives of the composite
5The aﬃliation of a ﬁr mt oas p e c i ﬁcs e c t o ri sb a s e do nt h eI C Bc o d eo fe a c hﬁrm, as
reported by Datastream.
6See the evidence provided by Drago, Santella, and Paone (2007).
15interests of the public shareholders.
4.3 Free cash ﬂow and board composition
The second testable implication of our theoretical model concerns the positive
relationship between the degree of board independence and ﬁrms’ free cash ﬂow.
Our empirical evidence strongly supports this theoretical prediction. In fact, as
t h ef r e ec a s hﬂow grows larger, the board composition shifts in favor of indepen-
dent members (see Table 3).
[INSERT TABLES 3 AND 4 ABOUT HERE]
In order to assess the ceteris paribus eﬀect of the free cash ﬂow on corporate
governance, in our econometric speciﬁcation we control for ﬁrms’ characteristics
— namely, market value and growth opportunities — that are likely to exert addi-
tional eﬀects on board structure. Table 3 shows the existence of a positive eﬀect
of ﬁrm size on the number of board members. More precisely, the higher is the
market value of a ﬁrm (a typical proxy for ﬁrm size), the larger is the size of
its board. However, the impact of ﬁrm size is non-linear, as it can be seen from
t h en e g a t i v ec o e ﬃcient of the quadratic term: as ﬁrm size grows, board size in-
creases as well, but at a decreasing rate. Larger boards are able to include more
(controlling and minority) representatives of shareholders: the coeﬃcients of non-
executive non-independent members and of minority members are both positive
and signiﬁcant. As a consequence, the share of executive members is decreasing
in ﬁrm size. Larger boards are also more likely to be organized in committees
in order to improve the eﬃciency of the decision process. Indeed, Table 4 con-
ﬁrms that the probability of observing compensation and audit committees is
increasing in ﬁrm size.
Turning to growth opportunities, measured by the market-to-book ratio,t h e y
call for speciﬁc knowledge to be fully exploited. Table 3 conﬁrms that where
such opportunities are more relevant the composition of boards shifts in favor of
executive members, who are typically more endowed with speciﬁc skills.
16Finally, the inclusion of controls for the speciﬁcf e a t u r e so fd i ﬀerent industries
leads to results (see Tables 3-4) that are very much in line with those already
shown in Tables 1-2.
4.4 Board composition and ﬁrm performance
The third testable implication of our theoretical model is that ﬁrms adopt a
governance institution whenever the beneﬁts from doing so exceed the associated
costs in terms of interference and coordination problems. Hence, one would expect
that when a governance institution is adopted, performance and consequently
ﬁrms’ value improve. Interestingly, the econometric exercises shown in Table 5
do not support this conclusion.
[INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE]
To the contrary, it appears that ﬁrms’ performance is negatively aﬀected by
the share of independent members in the board, while it is positively aﬀected by
the share of executive members. This suggests that executives, by bringing spe-
ciﬁc knowledge, contribute to the eﬃciency of the decision process. Independent
members, on the other hand, play mainly the role of monitoring decisions, so that
all shareholders are represented and the extraction of private beneﬁts by domi-
nant owners is limited. This role may sometimes reduce the speed and eﬃciency
of the board decision making process. Independent members may therefore be
included in the board even when the cost of keeping under control the agency
issue exceeds its beneﬁt. This result is not consistent with our theoretical model,
which would instead suggest that governance institutions should not be adopted
when it is too costly. However, at least two interpretations of this empirical
ﬁnding may be proposed. The ﬁrst is based on the eﬀects of (self-)regulatory
mechanisms (such as the Code of Conduct for listed companies) that may con-
strain the design of governance institutions, ‘forcing’ listed ﬁrms to introduce an
ineﬃciently large independent component in their boards. The second deals with
the implications of reputational concerns (most likely stimulated by the policy de-
bate on this matter) that, even in the absence of explicit regulatory constraints,
17may induce some corporations to sub-optimally add independent directors for
reputational concerns.
Interestingly, the presence of a minority list seems to have a positive impact on
t h em a r k e tv a l u eo fﬁrms (as measured by the market-to-book ratio), suggesting
that the market appreciates the introduction of an institution aimed at protecting
the interests of small shareholders. The same does not hold true for independent
members, suggesting that ﬁnancial markets consider the directors appointed by
minority owners as being more eﬀective than independent directors.
Our econometric speciﬁcations also provide indications on the use of commit-
tees in the organization of the board. In particular, on the one hand, the presence
of an executive committee seems to improve the eﬃciency of the decision process,
by separating the decision and the monitoring role of directors, leading to a bet-
ter performance. On the other hand, the presence of a compensation committee
seems to increase risk, possibly due to the adoption of compensation policies
introducing convex wage schedules (e.g. stock options), increasing managerial
incentives to take risky strategies7.
We also control for the eﬀect of board size on ﬁrms’ performance. On the
one hand, the addition of a new member to the board should have a positive
eﬀect regardless of her role: if an executive member, she provides speciﬁc skills
improving the advisory role of the board; if an independent/minority member,
she introduces an additional source of protection for small shareholders improving
the monitoring role of the board. On the other hand, however, the inclusion of
additional members beyond some threshold level might reduce the eﬃciency of the
decision process by exacerbating coordination problems. Our estimates highlight
the existence of such a trade-oﬀ:b o t ht h ep e r f o r m a n c em e a s u r e sw ec o n s i d e r—
ROA and EBIT/assets — and the market-to-book ratio are increasing in board
size, but the relationship is non-linear, pointing to a negative impact of board
size beyond some threshold level.8 T h es a m eh o l d st r u ew h e no n ec o n s i d e r st h e
7See Baglioni and Colombo (2009) for a discussion of the role of options in managerial
compensation and, more speciﬁcally, Ross (2004) for the eﬀects of options on managers’ risk-
taking attitudes.
8Analogous results are obtained when one considers the earnings before taxes, interests and
depreciation charges (EBITDA).
18standard deviation of the share price as a proxy measure for risk: increasing the
size of the board seems to improve the ability of the ﬁrm to take decisions, leading
to higher risk together with higher proﬁts. However, large boards are presumably
more conservative (due to the emergence of coordination issues), which leads to
less risk taking and to a reduction of expected proﬁtability.9
5 Concluding remarks
The empirical evidence we provide in this paper supports the prediction of our
theoretical model, conﬁrming the view that corporate boards are designed in order
to eﬃciently cope with the agency issues arising from the separation between
ownership and control. Governance institutions aimed at protecting the general
interest of shareholders — like independent directors, minority representatives
and committees — seem to be used more extensively where agency problems are
more severe. In particular, we show that board composition favors independent
members in ﬁrms where the free cash ﬂow is larger. Conversely, it favors executive
members in ﬁrms where ownership is more concentrated. Family ownership plays
a role similar to that of ownership concentration, leading to boards with a large
percentage of executive members.
As for the relationship between ﬁrm value and corporate governance, we ﬁnd
on the one hand that executive members exert a positive eﬀect on performance,
which is consistent with the view that executives — by bringing speciﬁck n o w l e d g e
— contribute to the eﬃciency of the decision process. On the other hand, inde-
pendent members seem to negatively aﬀect performance, suggesting that their
monitoring role may reduce the eﬃciency of the board decision making process.
This is somewhat puzzling, as it suggests that owners are willing to setup gov-
ernance institutions favoring independent directors even when the cost of doing
so exceeds the gains ensuing from their monitoring role, presumably due to the
impact of (self-)regulatory constraints and/or reputational concerns.
The econometric analysis of the paper leads also to some additional results
9Interestingly, the year dummies show that the share price volatility has been increasing
through time.
19going beyond the predictions of the theoretical model. In particular, we ﬁnd that
big ﬁrms tend to have larger boards than small ﬁrms, which are more likely to
be organized in committees; a result that is consistent with the view that the
delegation of speciﬁc tasks to committees improves the eﬃciency of the board
a c t i v i t y . T h i si sc o n ﬁrmed by the ﬁnding that the presence of an executive
committee has a positive impact on ﬁrms’ performance. We also show that ﬁrms
with high growth opportunities (proxied by a large market-to-book ratio), such
as high tech ﬁrms, favor executives bringing speciﬁc knowledge in their boards.
Interestingly, board composition varies in diﬀerent industries. Besides what
we already noted for high tech ﬁrms, ﬁnancial ﬁr m sa p p e a rt oh a v el a r g eb o a r d s
with several independent members, presumably due to the wide network of cross-
ownerships and cross-directorships that lies at the core of large banks and in-
surance companies in Italy. Similarly, the boards of utilities are typically char-
acterized by the presence of several independent and minority members, which
seems to respond to the representation needs of the several local public authorities
often constituting the major stakeholders of these ﬁrms. Furthermore, we ﬁnd
a concave relationship between ﬁrm performance (ROA and EBIT) and board
size, suggesting that the inclusion of additional members in the board has a pos-
itive impact up to a given threshold level and then turns negative, conﬁrming
the ﬁnding that the decision process of large boards may become increasingly
complex.
Our empirical analysis also highlights a remarkable heterogeneity across ﬁrms
in the adoption of governance institutions, depending on speciﬁc characteristics
of corporations, such as the degree of ownership concentration and the level of
free cash ﬂow. We have shown that the diverse governance mechanisms adopted
by diﬀerent ﬁrms are consistent with the objective of minimizing agency costs.
In this perspective, the paper has a strong policy implication, namely that the
regulators’ approach should not be one that imposes a detailed set of rules about
the design of governance institutions. It should instead be aimed at providing a
suﬃciently general regulatory framework within which ﬁrms remain free to design
their governance as an optimal response to their speciﬁc features.
Finally, we ﬁnd a negative correlation between the number of independent
20directors and ﬁrm performance (and ultimately value), a result that is somewhat
puzzling although not surprising, given that the analysis of the relationship be-
tween governance and performance has led to ambiguous results in the literature.
It is therefore a goal for future research to better investigate it, to understand
in particular whether the need of keeping under control agency issues may lead
to the adoption of sub-optimal governance institutions (in terms of ﬁrm perfor-
mance and value) due to the role of reputational concerns, or to the eﬀects of the
constraints imposed by the (self-)regulatory framework.
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22TABLE 1. Ownership concentration and board composition
Independent Variable                                                                                 Dependent variables
Executive members  Independent members          Non-executive   Minority members        Board size Female members 
            (%)              (%) non-indep. members (%)              (%) (number of members)           (%)
Top 3 shareholders ownership share (%) 0.172*** 0.175*** -0.207*** -0.210*** 0.038 0.040 -0.028 -0.012 -0.048*** -0.055*** 0.005 0.008
(0.035) (0.040) (0.052) (0.055) (0.051) (0.051) (0.026) (0.024) (0.008) (0.009) (0.014) (0.143)
Family ownership (dummy) 5.473*** 7.093*** -2.071 -4.648*** -3.874** -2.775 -1.672** -2.903*** -1.278*** -1.685*** 4.138*** 3.544***
(1.382) (1.435) (1.485) (1.495) (1.853) (1.770) (0.727) (0.725) (0.274) (0.292) (0.687) (0.720)
Shareholders agreements (dummy) -1.889 -2.274 -3.448* -2.402 4.824** 4.014* 0.113 0.360 1.099*** 1.338*** -1.500** -1.315**
(1.962) (2.114) (2.113) (2.181) (2.315) (2.333) (1.100) (1.130) (0.353) (0.392) (0.645) (0.649)
Dummy High Tech 13.648*** -2.529 -12.803*** 0.594 -2.155*** 0.320
(3.100) (2.664) (3.184) (1.151) (0.348) (1.133)
Dummy Financials  -9.026*** 9.647*** -1.200 1.213 3.089*** -1.527**
(1.591) (2.136) (2.179) (1.168) (0.390) (0.669)
Dummy Utilities -10.011*** 15.031*** -4.938 12.075*** 0.543 -4.519***
(2.042) (4.242) (4.249) (2.901) (0.454) (0.582)
Constant 20.669*** 18.698*** 50.973*** 54.664*** 28.705*** 26.507*** 4.397** 4.891*** 12.890*** 13.931*** 3.279*** 3.854***
(2.523) (2.716) (3.545) (3.709) (3.560) (3.388) (1.867) (1.614) (0.564) (0.646) (1.009) (1.041)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nr.Obs. 628 628 628 628 628 628 628 628 628 628 628 628
R-sq. 0.192 0.077 0.113 0.054 0.045 0.016 0.093 0.028 0.294 0.148 0.078 0.097
F 18.09 10.05 6.41 4.45 2.88 1.72 4.94 4.21 23.53 16.28 9.10 22.93
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.002] [0.114] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.TABLE 2. Ownership concentration and board committees
Independent Variable                     Dependent variables
Executive Committee Compensation Committeee   Audit Committee     Minority list
Top 3 shareholders (%) ownership share (%) -0.002*** -0.003*** -0.007*** -0.006*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.004*** -0.003***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Family ownership (dummy) -0.178*** -0.201*** -0.124*** -0.115*** -0.040 -0.041 -0.001 -0.049
(0.031) (0.028) (0.037) (0.036) (0.029) (0.029) (0.047) (0.045)
Shareholders agreements (dummy) 0.073* 0.097** -0.055 -0.065 0.007 0.006 0.015 0.030
(0.042) (0.043) (0.045) (0.045) (0.033) (0.034) (0.059) (0.565)
Dummy High Tech -0.065 0.018 -0.019 0.132*
(0.045) (0.059) (0.049) (0.079)
Dummy Financials 0.313*** -0.138*** -0.013 0.014
(0.044) (0.048) (0.034) (0.056)
Dummy Utilities -- 0.105 0.038 0.435***
(0.052) (0.047) (0.074)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes^
Nr.Obs. 596 628 628 628 628 628 628 628
Pseudo R-sq. 0.216 0.111 0.107 0.085 0.056 0.055 0.207 0.179
Wald Chi-sq. 106.64 54.79 70.92 52.17 23.04 20.11 148.97 140.53
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.006] [0.003] [0.000] [0.000]
Log Pseudo-L. -245.997 -285.774 -297.581 -304.892 -241.773 -242.171 -342.555 -354.644
Probit models (marginal effects). Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
First column model: no utilities have an executive committee.
^ Year dummies 2006 and 2007 positive and statistically significant at the 1% levelTABLE 3. Free cash flow and board composition
Independent variables                                                                         Dependent variable
 Executive members Independent members         Non-executive Minority members Board size
            (%)              (%) non-independent members (%)            (%) (number of members)
ln(free cash flow) -1.082* -1.627** 2.305*** 2.626*** -0.977 -0.821 0.458* 0.395 0.283** 0.326** 0.462***
(0.643) (0.780) (0.600) (0.618) (0.800) (0.810) (0.273) (0.289) (0.114) (0.133) (0.148)
ln(market value) -2.443*** -2.832*** -0.311 -0.029 2.572** 2.674** 0.955** 1.222*** 4.020*** 0.776*** 0.706***








ln(mtb) 2.539* 4.036*** 0.535 0.074 -3.315* -4.219** -0.441 -0.388 -0.327 -0.359 -0.470*
(1.511) (1.395) (1.615) (1.522) (1.757) (1.678) (0.664) (0.642) (0.296) (0.256) (0.242)
Dummy High Tech 5.679* 2.774 -7.867** 3.213** 0.027 -0.240
(3.368) (2.801) (3.314) (1.255) (0.361) (0.348)
Dummy Financials -7.864*** 7.033*** -1.122 0.514 1.708*** 2.165***
(1.962) (2.504) (2.598) (1.326) (0.447) (0.423)
Dummy Utilities -6.400*** 11.993*** -5.407 10.077*** -1.120** -1.331**
(1.940) (4.606) (4.365) (2.922) (0.531) (0.569)
Constant 76.235*** 85.229*** 13.832* 9.285 9.851 6.048 -14.687*** -16.286*** -28.004*** -3.563** -3.858***
(6.549) (6.789) (7.406) (6.782) (8.220) (8.049) (4.917) (4.494) (7.285) (1.455) (1.430)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nr.Obs. 499 499 499 499 499 499 499 499 486 499 499
R-sq. 0.218 0.182 0.125 0.092 0.037 0.024 0.142 0.083 0.422 0.398 0.332
F 18.00 20.49 6.13 8.03 2.53 2.27 4.86 4.61 27.36 26.50 24.72
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.008] [0.036] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.TABLE 4. Free cash flow and board committees
Independent variables Dependent variable
Executive Committee Compensation Committeee    Audit Committee     Minority list
ln(free cash flow) 0.028* 0.051*** 0.015 0.002 -0.006 -0.012 -0.015 -0.021
(0.015) (0.017) (0.013) (0.015) (0.010) (0.010) (0.018) (0.018)
ln(market value) 0.023 -0.005 0.054*** 0.046** 0.047*** 0.046*** 0.073*** 0.020***
(0.020) (0.022) (0.018) (0.020) (0.014) (0.015) (0.027) (0.027)
ln(mtb) 0.023 0.014 0.063 0.091** 0.063* 0.069* 0.015 0.020
(0.037) (0.037) (0.041) (0.041) (0.034) (0.035) (0.051) (0.047)
Dummy High Tech 0.068 0.093* 0.005 0.138
(0.079) (0.046) (0.044) (0.090)
Dummy Financials 0.342*** -0.229*** -0.100** -0.028
(0.057) (0.059) (0.046) (0.066)
Dummy Utilities -- -0.007 -0.075 0.335***
(0.079) (0.075) (0.095)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nr.Obs. 467 499 499 499 499 499 499 499
Pseudo R-sq. 0.176 0.070 0.115 0.070 0.106 0.091 0.225 0.204
Wald Chi-sq. 86.16 31.06 47.37 32.99 31.13 27.00 124.36 119.15
[p-value] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
Log Pseudo-L. -208.099 -242.471 -228.342 -240.123 -170.811 -173.853 -267.632 -274.976
Probit models (marginal effects). Robust standard errors in parenthesis. 
First column model: no utilities have an executive committee.
Last column models: 2006 and 2007 year dummies positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.TABLE 5. Board composition and firm's performance
             Independent variables                       Dependent variable
             ROA (*)      EBIT/Assets (%) (*)            MTB (*) Stand. dev. of share price
Executive members (%) 0.041* 0.044** 0.071** 0.071*** 0.008 0.014 0.008** 0.011***
(0.024) (0.022) (0.028) (0.027) (0.007) (0.009) (0.003) (0.003)
Independent members  (%) -0.022 -0.024* -0.029* -0.036** -0.006 -0.007 0.004 0.003
(0.014) (0.013) (0.016) (0.015) (0.005) (0.006) (0.002) (0.002)
Executive Committee  (dummy) 0.341* 0.214 0.783*** 0.527** 0.091 0.090 0.063 0.053
(0.201) (0.231) (0.275) (0.252) (0.200) (0.202) (0.085) (0.084)
Compensation Committeee  (dummy) -0.450 -0.178 -0.281 0.133 -0.165 -0.049 0.157* 0.227**
(0.722) (0.734) (0.817) (0.811) (0.266) (0.224) (0.093) (0.101)
Audit Committee (dummy) 0.502 0.424 0.412 0.328 0.225 0.210 0.092 0.087
(0.678) (0.687) (0.887) (0.903) (0.276) (0.291) (0.099) (0.106)
Minority list  (dummy) -0.762 -0.461 0.905 1.143 0.491* 0.594* -0.076 -0.047
(0.832) (0.716) ('0.769) (0.745) (0.291) (0.353) (0.136) (0.140)
Board size 0.946** 0.948** 0.929** 0.956** 0.219*** 0.171** 0.161*** 0.130**
(0.419) (0.379) (0.383) (0.376) (0.066) (0.072) (0.053) (0.059)
Board size
2 -0.030** -0.032** -0.027** -0.032** -0.008*** -0.006** -0.005*** -0.004**
(0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002)
Dummy Financials -0.849 -2.245*** 0.011 -0.129
(0.768) (0.794) (0.169) (0.139)
Dummy High Tech 0.864 -0.886 1.573** 0.644*
(2.349) (1.561) (0.789) (0.345)
Dummy Utilities 1.861** 1.576 -0.220 -0.302**
(0.787) (1.015) (0.218) (0.127)
Constant -2.361 -2.376 -2.052 -2.315 0.504 0.722 -1.100*** -0.977**
(2.807) (2.705) (2.918) (2.915) (0.513) (0.571) (0.395) (0.416)
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Nr.Obs. 465 465 457 457 470 470 628 628
R-sq. 0.047 0.041 0.073 0.057 0.077 0.036 0.081 0.063
F 3.13 2.79 4.79 3.29 4.88 4.97 3.25 3.42
[p-value] [0.000] [0.002] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000] [0.000]
 
(*) All independent variables lagged one period.
Robust standard errors in parenthesis.
Last column models: all year dummies positive and statistically significant at the 1% level.Appendix Table
Variables definition and descriptive statistics
Vbs. Data source Definition Mean Standard deviationMin Max
Ownership structure
Ownership share of all relevant shareholders (%) Consob Total ownership share of all shareholders owning at least 2% of the firm's equity 61.86 16.82 0 100
Top 3 relevant shareholders ownership share (%) Consob Total ownership share of the three largest shareholders 56.95 18.13 0 100
Number of relevant shareholders Consob Number of shareholders owning at least 2% of the firm's equity 4 2.51 0 14
Family ownership (dummy) Consob Dummy equal to 1 if the firm is controlled by a family 0.36 0.48 0 1
Shareholders agreements (dummy) Consob Dummy equal to 1 if there is a shareholders' agreement 0.22 0.41 0 1
Board structure
Board size Reports on corporate governance Number of board members 10.5 3.96 3 25
Executive members (%) Reports on corporate governance Percentage of executive members in the board 30.69 18.51 0 100
Independent members (%) Reports on corporate governance Percentage of non-executive independent members in the board 39.48 20.3 0 100
Non-executive non-independent members (%) Reports on corporate governance Percentage of non-executive non-independent members in the board 29.27 21.87 0 86.67
Minority representatives (%) Reports on corporate governance Percentage of minority members in the board 4.23 10 0 52.9
Female members (%) Reports on corporate governance Percentage of female members in the board 5.47 7.84 0 40
Executive committee (dummy) Reports on corporate governance Dummy equal to 1 if there is an executive committee 0.21 0.41 0 1
Size of the executive committee Reports on corporate governance Number of members in the executive committee 1.18 2.42 0 10
Compensation committee (dummy) Reports on corporate governance Dummy equal to 1 if there is a compensation committee  0.78 0.42 0 1
Size of the compensation committee Reports on corporate governance Number of members in the compensation committee 2.5 1.5 0 8
Audit committee (dummy) Reports on corporate governance Dummy equal to 1 if there is an audit committee  0.86 0.35 0 1
Size of the audit committee Reports on corporate governance Number of members in the audit committee 2.7 1.29 0 7
Minority list Reports on corporate governance Dummy equal to 1 if there is a minority list 0.45 0.5 0 1
Firms' characteristics
Assets (thousands of Euro) Datastream (WC02999) sum of all assets 1.55E+07 7.53E+07 14468 1.01E+09
Sales (thousands of Euro) Datastream DWSL sum of all sales 3300401 1.04E+07 3311 8.43E+07
Market value (thousands of Euro) Datastream MV Year-end stock price times number of shares 2471839 9252211 5860 1.02E+08
Free cash flow  (thousands of Euro) Datastream (DWFC) Operating cash flows less fixed capital investments  568328.6 2427911 -7272183 2.30E+07
Market to book  Datastream (MTBV) Market value over book value of equity capital 2.17 2.1 -3.52 40.7
Firms' performance
ROA Datastream WC08326 Net revenue over total assets 3 7 -37.27 76.28
Ebit Datastream DEWB Earnings before taxes and interests 519364.1 2192813 -739690 2.47E+07
EBITDA Datastream DEWD Earnings before taxes, interests and depreciation charges 683415.1 2794354 -6735950 3.17E+07
SD of share price Datastream  Standard deviation of stock prices 0.85 1.48 0.003 21.08 
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